Civilian casualty risks and computer-aided tactical command

An issue appears to be raised in the recent offensive in Afghanistan concerning command decisions resulting in unacceptable civilian casualties.

Required reading: Freeman Dyson on the conduct of bombing in Europe late in WWII.

The issue is reliable intelligence, clear objectives and partial information combined with probabilities and available statistics.  The world-wide increase in journalistic feedback in print, audio and images combined with the prospect of more global web coverage and ubiquitous cell cams must increase the urgency of risk melioration.

Unresolved or even unsolvable tactical problems remain apparent in news reports even with computer-guided munitions and remote-controlled drones.

Officers in command on the ground will soon expect a distibuted game-based iPad app at their disposal so as to better be advised in releasing drones to engage targets - or even handing off the decision to the cyber-meister.

Remote-controlled warfare would seem but one step from computer-aided decision making in realtime combat (already long practiced in artillery ranging but likely not yet deployed in the decision-making in calls for artillery bombardment or for the type of ogive or ogive fusing requested, or in calls for close air support of one kind or another.)  What is the risk that a near-by school or hospital will collapse?  Could the officer in command be expected know of last year's quake in that region or last year's bombardment having caused likely structural damage?  These look to be data+decision issues if this were business - but with demanding time constraints - as in realtime gaming.

Given the concerns to reduce friendly fire casualties in a professional or volunteer army, analysis of firing co-ordinates likely is done now in realtime by software.

Risks in the continued use of phosphorus shells recently resurfaced in the Israeli-Gaza conflict.

In the case of misfortune, would the military then direct the anger of journalists, civilian authorities and victims to the software vendors?  Should redress be through the courts?  If those vendors built the software using patent protection, what should be their legal liability?  If the patent holders benefited from enforced international protection of those patents, what should international law recognize as  the liability of firms and programmers providing for-profit military software built with patented algorithms or patented software inventions?