The opening of the pre-emptive war with Iraq through the use of cruise missiles is a kind of warfare which I term "selective warfare". The Polish response to Nazi and Soviet invasions was not selective in the sense which I intend - it my be termed "responsive warfare" in response to all-out attack, invasion, as opposed to sniping, border incursions, diplomatic insults and the like. Slaughter by Nazi and Soviet forces and the doctrines animating both (Poles as "sub-humans" and Poles as "can never be trusted", respectively) bore out the need to defend the Polish people and their newly restored nation at almost all costs.
Iraq. The direct victims of the Septenber 11 attacks on US soil number some 3000+ if one includes consideration of the health harm done to various rescuers and others during the attack and in the aftermath. Some estimates of civilian casualties in the Iraq war place the number near 100,000 by early 2010. If it is shown that the porous Iraq border with Syria and Saudi Arabia would allow the US to "bring the war on terror" to Iraq in a way in which sheer physical barriers had prevented a wide influx to Afghanistan (15 of the 19 attackers were from Saudi Arabia and none from a country neighboring Afghanistan), then it might be argued that a war against the Kufar had been brought onto Arab soil without justification.
If the majority of the attackers had been Iranian and their leader Persian, the war would have been fought on Iranian soil - and perhaps with UN-backing. If the majority of the attackers had been Pakistani, then it would be reasonable to think that US forces would be today trying to establish democracy in the tribal lands of Pakistan. But the majority were Saudi.
Showing posts with label remote-controlled warfare. Show all posts
Showing posts with label remote-controlled warfare. Show all posts
Wednesday, March 10, 2010
Tuesday, March 2, 2010
Civilian casualty risks and computer-aided tactical command
An issue appears to be raised in the recent offensive in Afghanistan concerning command decisions resulting in unacceptable civilian casualties.
Required reading: Freeman Dyson on the conduct of bombing in Europe late in WWII.
The issue is reliable intelligence, clear objectives and partial information combined with probabilities and available statistics. The world-wide increase in journalistic feedback in print, audio and images combined with the prospect of more global web coverage and ubiquitous cell cams must increase the urgency of risk melioration.
Unresolved or even unsolvable tactical problems remain apparent in news reports even with computer-guided munitions and remote-controlled drones.
Officers in command on the ground will soon expect a distibuted game-based iPad app at their disposal so as to better be advised in releasing drones to engage targets - or even handing off the decision to the cyber-meister.
Remote-controlled warfare would seem but one step from computer-aided decision making in realtime combat (already long practiced in artillery ranging but likely not yet deployed in the decision-making in calls for artillery bombardment or for the type of ogive or ogive fusing requested, or in calls for close air support of one kind or another.) What is the risk that a near-by school or hospital will collapse? Could the officer in command be expected know of last year's quake in that region or last year's bombardment having caused likely structural damage? These look to be data+decision issues if this were business - but with demanding time constraints - as in realtime gaming.
Given the concerns to reduce friendly fire casualties in a professional or volunteer army, analysis of firing co-ordinates likely is done now in realtime by software.
Risks in the continued use of phosphorus shells recently resurfaced in the Israeli-Gaza conflict.
In the case of misfortune, would the military then direct the anger of journalists, civilian authorities and victims to the software vendors? Should redress be through the courts? If those vendors built the software using patent protection, what should be their legal liability? If the patent holders benefited from enforced international protection of those patents, what should international law recognize as the liability of firms and programmers providing for-profit military software built with patented algorithms or patented software inventions?
Required reading: Freeman Dyson on the conduct of bombing in Europe late in WWII.
The issue is reliable intelligence, clear objectives and partial information combined with probabilities and available statistics. The world-wide increase in journalistic feedback in print, audio and images combined with the prospect of more global web coverage and ubiquitous cell cams must increase the urgency of risk melioration.
Unresolved or even unsolvable tactical problems remain apparent in news reports even with computer-guided munitions and remote-controlled drones.
Officers in command on the ground will soon expect a distibuted game-based iPad app at their disposal so as to better be advised in releasing drones to engage targets - or even handing off the decision to the cyber-meister.
Remote-controlled warfare would seem but one step from computer-aided decision making in realtime combat (already long practiced in artillery ranging but likely not yet deployed in the decision-making in calls for artillery bombardment or for the type of ogive or ogive fusing requested, or in calls for close air support of one kind or another.) What is the risk that a near-by school or hospital will collapse? Could the officer in command be expected know of last year's quake in that region or last year's bombardment having caused likely structural damage? These look to be data+decision issues if this were business - but with demanding time constraints - as in realtime gaming.
Given the concerns to reduce friendly fire casualties in a professional or volunteer army, analysis of firing co-ordinates likely is done now in realtime by software.
Risks in the continued use of phosphorus shells recently resurfaced in the Israeli-Gaza conflict.
In the case of misfortune, would the military then direct the anger of journalists, civilian authorities and victims to the software vendors? Should redress be through the courts? If those vendors built the software using patent protection, what should be their legal liability? If the patent holders benefited from enforced international protection of those patents, what should international law recognize as the liability of firms and programmers providing for-profit military software built with patented algorithms or patented software inventions?
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